We hope you enjoy the programs at eClub One

Iraq – Prospects for the Future

Rotarian Lt. Col. Rick Francona (Retired) has presented three eClub One programs on the Middle East and Iraq.  Here is a fresh look at Iraq.  Currently Rick is under contract to NBC as a Middle East military analyst.

Q.  Will there be a civil war in Iraq?

There is a report being drafted at CIA right now warning of the real possibility of a civil war in Iraq once sovereignty is transferred to an Iraqi government, and American and coalition troops withdraw.  The key component of that is the withdrawal of American and coalition forces.  Their presence will prevent a civil war, and in the foreseeable future, only their presence will prevent the three major factions from confrontations that inevitably turn violent. 

In my view, the three major constituencies in the country have taken irreconcilable positions.  These positions are based on their different histories in Iraq and their views of how a future Iraq should be constituted.  The Shi’a make up roughly 60 percent of the 25 million Iraqis; the remaining are divided into roughly equal numbers of Sunni Arabs and Kurds (who are Sunni, but the religion is not really a factor).  The remaining Assyrians, Turkomans and Chaldeans have almost no political power, although Turkey keeps a protective eye on the Turkomans. 

The core problems as I see them:

• The Shi’a, mostly followers of Grand Ayatollah Al-Sayyid ‘Ali Husayni Al-Sistani, demand direct elections prior to transfer of sovereignty, now slated for this summer.  A smart political move on his part, as this would virtually guarantee a Shi’a-dominated government that will lean toward Islamic-influenced laws.  Al-Sistani has said that he does not want an Islamic republic like Iran (Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is on record stating that the United States will not permit it in any case).  The Shi’a have thus far not resisted the American occupation, owing to the moral authority of the ayatollahs.  Several clerics have stated that if they do not get what they want, they will fight, beginning with widespread violent demonstrations against coalition forces.   In my opinion, they may wish demonstrate, but I doubt Al-Sistani will condone violence.  Recently, Al-Sistani has asked the Shi’a to curb their demonstrations, believing that they have made their position known.

• The Sunnis do not favor direct elections.  For the same reasons mentioned above, they will be the losers.  Because of that perception, Sunni clerics are extolling the virtues of jihad in their Friday sermons.  That jihad is not only aimed at the U.S. occupation, but other Iraqis as well.  They believe that unless they fight, they will end up with no political power.   Since the days of the Ottomans, the Sunni have always been the masters of the country, despite their numerical inferiority.  They were always chosen by the “conqueror du jour” to dominate the other ethnic groups, primarily the Shi’a.  Their continued resistance to the American occupation has insured that they will not have a favored position in the new Iraq.  My assessment is that they stand the most to lose in a new Iraq and are good candidates to participate, maybe even precipitate, a civil war.

• The Kurds do not want to give up the virtual autonomy in the north that they have enjoyed for the last 13 years, thanks to the U.S. Air Force and its enforcement of the No-Fly Zones since 1991.  As with the Sunnis, a direct election now will hurt the Kurds’ chances for not only fair representation, but also will mean an end to their quasi-Kurdistan.  Not all aspects of their autonomy are good – the cessation of Arabic as the language of education in the Kurdish area has hurt the formation of a new army; there are Kurd recruits who cannot speak Arabic.  Despite Kurdish nationalism and separatism, Arabic is the lingua franca in the country.  I wrote a piece for MSNBC.COM (http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3070272/) in April that is mostly still valid.  The Kurds further want to control Mosul (made up of Arabs and Kurds) and Kirkuk (Arabs, Turkomans and Kurds) – including the oil revenues from some of the richest proven reserves in the world.   I doubt that whatever central Iraqi government is formed will favor granting almost half of Iraq’s oil revenues to the Kurds.

• Turkey, Iran and Syria do not support continued Kurdish autonomy, claiming that any attempts to maintain Kurdish autonomy is “unacceptable.”  Turkey is doubly concerned – they fear any sense of Kurdish nationalism, although the Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Iran are different ethno-linguistically from Kurds in Turkey.  The Turks also do not want any subjugation of the ethnic Turkic Turkomans resident mostly in Kirkuk to the Iraqi Kurds.

With these seemingly intractable and opposing positions, it is difficult to comprehend a democratic Iraq, especially by this summer.

Q.  Why are the Shi’a clerics demanding immediate direct elections?

The primary Shi’a cleric, as I mentioned above, is the Grand Ayatollah Al-Sayyid ‘Ali Husayni Al-Sistani.   He is revered by his followers, and exerts tremendous influence over 15 million Iraqis.  Consider him the Pope of the Iraqi Shi’a.

As a grand ayatollah, Al-Sistani holds the highest religious rank in the Shi'a adherence - there are currently only five grand ayatollahs in the world.  The term Al-Sayyid in his title indicates a familial relationship to Muhammad.  He is also a marja' al-taqlid (literally "source of emulation") which allows him to issue fatwas, or binding religious edicts. This makes him equal to a grand mufti (same root word as fatwa) in the Sunni adherence.  (See http://www.sistani.org/html/eng/ for more on the ayatollah.)

We in the West in general and the United States in particular, with our separation of church and state, tend to disregard the moral (and in some countries legal) authority a mufti or marja commands. One of the reasons we have had so few problems thus far in the southern part of Iraq is the unity of the Shi'a community and their respect for the moral authority of Sistani. He issued a fatwa early on instructing the Shi'a to respect the occupation. The violence in the south has mostly been from outsiders.

That could change with the stroke pen.  A fatwa to boycott the upcoming caucus or whatever system the coalition establishes will in effect kill it.   AL-Sistani is not only acting out of piety. Forcing direct elections serves the Shi'a majority politically as they will likely dominate any resulting forum. Unlike our bicameral government, there will be no alternate body that protects against the tyranny of the majority. Once in power, they can shape the future government in accordance with the wishes of the Shi'a leadership (read: Al-Sistani).  That means an Islamic influenced government, which is not necessarily a bad thing.  What we don't want - and Sistani has said he does not favor - is an Islamic republic like that in Iran.

So why push for direct elections now?  Sistani is concerned that the Kurds and Sunnis will be able to caucus effectively to set up enclaves or carve out (such as statutory confessional positions like in Lebanon - not a great model) more political power than their numbers warrant.  I don't think he is overly concerned about the Kurds - they are firmly entrenched in the north and basically want to be left alone, of course after they consolidate their tenuous hold on Mosul and Kirkuk. 

Al-Sistani is mostly concerned about the Sunnis, remembering the suffering of the Shi'a under not only Saddam, but also the short-lived republic before that, the Hashemite monarchy before that, the British mandatory authorities before that, and even the Ottomans before that.  All of these rulers favored the Sunni and placed them in power over the Shi'a.  Suffice it to say, the bitterness runs deep.

Q.  Is the scheduled transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi government realistic?

The current timetable for transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis calls for the formation of transitional assembly this May, followed by the election of an interim government in June.  How that election is conducted is the major debate right now.  The United Nations has dispatched a team to discuss various options with the Iraqi transitional authorities on how to satisfy the demands of the various factions.  The end goal is to have a directly elected new government by the end of 2005.

Despite all the attention being paid to the modality of an election, the real stumbling block here is the security situation.  Until the insurgency is destroyed, the chances there can be an effective and accepted Iraqi interim government are small.

This brings up the continued presence of American troops.  Let’s not confuse the transfer of sovereignty and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.  Although the timetable calls for Iraqi sovereignty this year and a new government by the end of next year, American forces will not be departing the area anytime soon.  I think we should look at this in terms of years, not months.   This is for several reasons.  There is the obvious one of protecting the new government, but also a place to keep a sizeable American force on the ground in the region.  If the administration wishes to effect change in other countries, it will need to have a credible military force in the area.

Q.  There appears to have been no weapons of mass destruction, so what was the rush in attacking Iraq in 2003?

The immediacy of the decision to attack Iraq was driven by the concern fear that Saddam soon would no longer be contained, or “in a box” as some has described it.

The No-Fly Zones were becoming harder to enforce because of host nation sensibilities (Saudi Arabia and UAE in the south, and Turkey in the north; the Navy could not handle the load with carrier-based aviation alone). That said, the NFZ really had little to do with any suspected WMD programs - they were originally established to protect the Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north from the Iraqi military.  Any WMD programs would be located in the central area between 33 and 36 degrees north.

There was little support for continued United Nations sanctions among those who counted at the time - specifically the other (non-US and UK) permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, France and China), as well as Germany, a non-permanent member of the UNSC.  All of these countries had lucrative post-sanctions contracts with Saddam's government.

Since Hans Blix and UNSCOM/UNMOVIC had no access to the country and were believed to be about to declare Iraq in compliance with the UNSC Resolutions that triggered the sanctions, the concern was that
sanctions would be lifted.

Once that happened, Saddam would essentially be out of the box and free to pursue whatever programs he wished.  As David Kay suggests, at that time the dormant WMD programs could be easily and quickly restarted.

I still find it puzzling that Saddam did not accept and cooperate on UNSCR 1441. If he had succeeded in convincing the UN inspectors that he did not have WMD, as it appears to be the case, he could have
sidetracked any American plan to invade. There is no way the US could have attacked; we would have spent millions deploying a large force with nowhere to go, he would remain in power.

<<< For a Make-Up...
Select this Make-Up Request Form link.
 

To make a comment without a makeup...
Select the Critique Email link.>>>

CRITIQUE EMAIL
PLEASE ENTER
PROGRAM NAME
IN SUBJECT LINE