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IRAQ UPDATE from a Rotarian Rotarian Lt. Col. Rick Francona (Retired) has presented two eClub One programs on the Middle East and Iraq.  Here is his update on Iraq.  Currently Rick is under contract to NBC as a Middle East military analyst.

Q.  What is the current situation in Iraq?

A.  Probably not what you are seeing or hearing in the media.  Most of us rely on the mainstream news organizations – and I include NBC/MCNBC/CNBC with whom I am currently under contract – to inform us as to what is going on in Iraq.  Unfortunately, the coverage from these outlets is like “looking through a straw.”  If you watch reporters in Baghdad, with only a few exceptions, they will be standing in Firdus Square in front of the Shahid mosque.  This location is in front of the two hotels where the journalists stay, the Palestine Meridian and the Ishtar Sheraton (I have stayed at both); it is probably one of the safest spots in Baghdad.  These journalists should put aside their normal routine, get out of town and report what is happening all over the country – not just when there is an incident somewhere. 

That said, the situation is both good and bad.  The regime of Saddam Husayn is gone.  Although the atrocities of that regime were well known, the uncovering of the mass graves, opening of the torture centers and detention facilities is highlighting just how evil Saddam was.  His neglect of the infrastructure has created huge problems.  During the period after the Gulf War while Iraq was under United Nations sanctions, he was allowed to sell as much as he wished as long as the money was used for food and medicine.  This should have allowed him to spend other resources on maintaining the infrastructure of the country – roads, bridges, electricity grid, oil production and distribution facilities, etc.  He did neither.  He refused to sell the oil that would have fed his people, choosing to spend the country’s resources on his own palaces and taking care of his inner circle.  When the infrastructure was sabotaged Saddam’s forces as American forces approached Baghdad, most of it was damaged beyond repair.  The reconstitution of basic services is proving much more difficult than imagined, but it is happening.

The biggest problem is the security situation.  There are attacks by Saddam loyalists and imported jihadis (Islamic terrorists) every day, ranging from sniper attacks to rocket-propelled grenades to mines to homemade explosive devices.  Soldiers are being wounded and killed.  While overall, the level of casualties is relatively low, the high level of media attention makes them seem much higher.  For example, U.S. losses in Vietnam were significantly higher over a longer period of time, but there was much less media.  In the age of 24 hour reporting, with instant communications, every loss is reported over and over to almost everyone in the country.

The other, but related, security problem is that of common crime.  This seems to be limited mainly to the areas that are also experiencing the continued attacks on coalition forces.  Just prior to the war, Saddam released over 100,000 criminals from prisons. The south, dominated by the Shi’a majority, is fairly secure – the Shi’a clerics exercise great moral authority over the population.  The north, primarily the Kurdish area, has been fairly secure for over a decade.  It is in the so-called “Sunni triangle,” the area between Baghdad, Tikrit and Al-Fallujah, that crime seems to be rampant.  Only the creation of an effective Iraqi police force will solve this – and that effort is underway.

Other problems plague the country – unemployment, unreliable utilities, gas shortages, etc.  These are all real problems, but from what I am told, 90 to 95 percent of the Iraqis believe they are better off now than under Saddam.  It is the other five to 10 percent that are causing the problems.  These are the Ba’th party members, the Saddam loyalists who have lost everything and have little hope that a new Iraq will be as good for them.

Q.  What about the weapons of mass destruction?  Isn’t that why we went to war?

This is an area that must be addressed by the administration.  The CIA and Pentagon have created the Iraqi Survey Group to gather all the information and evidence relating to the weapons of mass destruction programs and related delivery systems.  It is headed up by David Kay, a former UN weapons inspector.  I know and have worked with Dr. Kay – he is very well respected. The government is being close-mouthed on this effort, waiting until the investigation is complete before releasing the information.  It is my personal view that the Iraqis had weapons of mass destruction, at least chemical weapons, as late as last fall.  I think that once it was evident that Saddam ordered them destroyed once it became apparent the United States was serious about removing them one way or the other.  It will be interesting to see the final report from this group.

Q.  Why would he do that and then not open up the country to UN inspectors?

A.  Good question.  Let me give you my theory on Saddam’s strategy.  I call it “losing on his own terms.”  Once it became apparent that the United States was going to attack, Saddam knew he would lose the battles, but hoped that he could survive the war.  To him, as he has learned from past experience, mere survival is victory.  To survive, however, required that his battle plan work.  As was made clear to him in Desert Storm in 1991, his forces were no match for those of the U.S.-led coalition.  In every category of military power, he was hopelessly outgunned and outmatched.  While his forces had at best stagnated since 1991, American forces had gone through at least one generation of modernization.  A crushing military defeat was a virtual certainty.  How then could he hope to survive the coming military onslaught?  He may have planned to continue his time-tested tactic of delaying as long as possible, hoping that in the end there would be a diplomatic solution, a last-minute rabbit-out-of-the-hat deal brokered by what he perceived to be his supporters in the United Nations: France, Russia and China.  Saddam had on occasion referred to these nations as “Iraq’s friends” in that body.

Saddam hoped that by the time American forces reached the outskirts of Baghdad after many weeks what he thought would be slow-moving, costly combat operations, the world would demand a cessation to the bloodshed.  Further, he believed that the world, as well as the American public, would want to spare of the loss of life an attack on the large urban area of Baghdad would entail.  He hoped that United Nations action would somehow spare him.  Later UN inspections – a virtual certainty if his tactic had worked – would find no weapons and he would (in his mind) appear vindicated.

He was wrong on almost every count.

Q.  What is the long-term U.S. interest in Iraq?

Obviously, access to Persian Gulf oil – I hope that does not come as a surprise to anyone.  It has been American policy since at least the Carter administration that American military power will be brought to bear to ensure access to the oil of the region at stable and reasonable prices.  That was the basis for our support of Iraq against Iran in the 1980’s, the reason for our defense of Saudi Arabia in 1990 and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

Now, let’s take a longer-term political view here.  The are two significant objectives here:

• -  assuming that there are now pro-American/pro-Western governments in place in Iraq and Afghanistan, that leaves the two remaining potential adversaries in the region – Syria and Iran – virtually surrounded.  This will allow Washington to apply political pressure for change in these countries.
   

• - introduction of democratic government into the Arab Middle East. Of course, that will likely not be welcomed by virtually any of the existing regimes.

Q.  How long will American troops be there?

Given our inability to easily disengage from such deployments, it would appear that we will have a significant troop presence for at least five years, probably longer.  We still have troops in Bosnia, although in 1995, the deployment was touted as no longer than one year.

We should be prepared for the long haul.

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